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Obscenity and censorship are perhaps the most unsettled areas
of constitutional law in this country today. To many, the deep
divisions and divergent attitudes of the Justices of the Supreme
Court constitute an intolerable state of affairs for a functioning
system of jurisprudence. This article will not present a panacea
for these problems. But in an area where disagreement abounds,
examination of the approach of another legal system can lead to
clearer thinking, reorientation of analysis, and a better over-view
of the entire area. Since many of the problems which have plagued
the courts in this country have likewise been raised in Swiss censor-
ship litigation, the reader should find Swiss solutions enlightening.
HE MOST recent decisions by the Supreme Court of the
United States on censorship1 have only served to multiply the
confusion surrounding this important area of constitutional law.
The existence and strength of widely divergent views among not
only the high court's Justices but also the various forces in our
society appear to be almost irreconcilable. In this type of situa-
tion, it is interesting and instructive to examine the approach taken
to the censorship problem in other countries whose legal systems
are similar to our own. Such a country is Switzerland, and this
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article will compare the law of Swiss censorship-limited to censor-
ship of movies-to that existing in this country.
I
GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF Swiss LAW
Switzerland is a federal republic embracing 22 states-called
cantons-containing five and one-half million people. It is a
country roughly comparable in size to the states of Vermoit and
New Hampshire combined.
The Swiss people, like our own, have always possessed an inde -
pendent spirit, love of liberty, and devotion to democratic insti-
tutions. Lord Bryce wrote that Switzerland "has pushed democratic
doctrines farther, and worked them out more consistently, than
any other European State. ' 2 Recently a knowledgeable expert
said that "Switzerland is often thought of as the most democratic
of modem state systems."8
The Swiss have delegated to the central authorities only those
powers deemed absolutely necessary to handle problems no longer
amenable to local solution. As might be expected, these powers are
somewhat more-ample than those granted to the national govern-
ment in a vast country like our own. Nonetheless, the Confedera-
tion appears to be highly respectful of the rights of the cantons to
legislate without interference on matters truly local in nature.
Thus a respected Swiss scholar has said:
The principle of our federal state is to reserve to its members, the
cantons, sovereignty in those domains where power. ought to be
held as close as possible to one's person and conscience. These
sacredly reserved domains are: that of public education, that of
church-state relations, that of the minority tongues 4
The "principle" referred to by the professor just quoted finds
expression in article 3 of the Swiss constitution: "The cantons are
sov ereigii insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal
constitution, and as such they exercise all the rights which are not
delegated to the federal power." The tenth amendment to the
.American Constitution is almost identical: "The powers not dele-
-BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES 327 (1921).
'CODDING, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SWIZERLAND 55 (1961).
'Address by Professor Gonzague de Reynold, in La Libert6 (Fribourg); Aug.'lj
1962, p. 1, col. 2.
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gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." Article 27ter, added to the Swiss constitution in 1958, spe-
cifically allocates the power to legislate on movies and their produc-
tion between the local and federal governments. It authorizes the
federal government to legislate for the encouragemeht of the film
industry, but further provides that in all other respects -"cinema
legislation and its application are within the competence of the
cantons."
Even where legislative power is granted to the cantons, how-
ever, the latter often act only with the close cooperation of the
central government. And in every case, should local authorities
actually infringe personal liberties, a supreme court of the central
government-the Tribunal Federal-stands as a court of last appeal;
The constitutional provisions which restrict governmental ac-
tion vis--vis the individual are strikingly similar to those in the
United States. Article 4 provides that "all Swiss are equal before
the law," and, as will be indicated below, is interpreted by Swiss
courts analogously to the equal protection clause of our fourteenth
amendment. 5 Other constitutional provisions safeguard freedom
of conscience and belief,5 the press,7 association,8 and opinion.9
II
TiE Swiss CENSORSHIP APPROACH
Before discussing individual points of comparison between
Swiss and American law, it will be advantageous to set out the
general approach to movie censorship developed by the Tribunal
Federal. This approach in itself is of comparative significance.
In addition, it provides a framework within which the reader can
5 See also Swiss CoNsr. 1874, art. 60: "Every canton is bound to accord to citizens
of the other confederated states the same treatment as to its own citizens in regard to
legislation and all that concerns judicial proceedings."
a SWISS CONST. 1874, arts. 49, 27. Swiss authorities are in the process of drafting
a revised constitution which will eliminate restrictions found in arts. 50, 51, and 52-
all vestiges of former times.7 Swiss CONsr. 1874, art. 55.
" SwIss CONsr. 1874, art. 56. Additional guarantees punctuate the constitution at
several points. See, e.g., Swiss CONsT. arts. 57, 58, 106, 112, 113.
No provision of the federal constitution expressly guarantees freedom of opinion.
Most of. the cantonal constitutions, however, have such a provision. E.g., Zusuca
CONsr. art. 3. Additionally, article 55, protecting freedom of the press, is often inter-
preted to include freedom of opinion, but it does not apply to the cinema. See part
IV D of this article infra.
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judge how Swiss solutions to particular censorship problems might
work in the United States.
A. "White Slavery"
Section 25 of an ordinance of the Canton of Zurich provides:
"The showing of films immoral, corrupting or in another manner
improper is forbidden; likewise the advertisement of cinema presen-
tations by title, poster, leaflets or insertions of this nature."10 On
April 8, 1953, the Department of Police of Zurich forbade the show-
ing of a film entitled "Traite des Blanches" (White Slavery) be-
cause of "the criminal character of the film; its manner of pre-
senting the world of pimps and white slavery; its coarseness and
widespread brutality-all of which is 'corrupting and improper'
according to section 25 . .. "-I'
The Gamma-Film Distribution Company appealed to the Con-
seil d'Etat, the seven-member Executive of the Canton of Zurich,
in June of 1953.12 The appeal was rejected, whereupon Gamma took
its ,case to the Tribunal Federal.
The Tribunal correctly discerned the basis of the Council's ac-
tion. "[T]he Conseil d'Etat admits that the film is not immoral, but
judges it to be corrupting and repulsive. 13 This standard was not,
the Tribunal felt, overly vague:
The ordinance of Zurich does not say what is necessary for some-
thing to be corrupting or improper. But the meaning of these
words is clear; a film is corrupting and improper if it is capable of
10 Quoted in Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal
F&hlral, March 3, 1954, at 1 (Swit.). (This is an unreported decision. Only a certain
percentage of decisions of the Tribunal Federal are published and printed in the
official reports.)
The word "improper" is a translation of the French word choquant. It can also
mean "offensive" or "unpleasant."
It is interesting to note that there are no national laws proscribing immoral films,
this being an area reserved for cantonal legislation. But there are national laws which
forbid obscene printed material and illustrations.
"I Ibid.
12 See id. at 3.
2 Id. at 8 (all translations are the author's).
The Tribunal does not give in any of the cases a definition of "immorality."
However, in 1927 it said of "obscenity": "A publication is obscene in the sense of the
federal law of September 30, 1925, when, objectively, by its subject and the fashion of
treatment, it is likely to shock sexual decency, when its end is essentially to arouse
the sexual passions, when it intends no scientific or artistic purposes, and when be-
cause of the method of propaganda and because of the people reached it threatens
to exert a corrupting action on morals." A. K. contre Tribune de Police, Tribunal
F&ld6ral, July 7, 1927, 53 (1.) Arr~ts du Tribunal F~d~ral 234 (Swit.).
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having an unfavorable influence on morals and of offending the
sensibilities of spectators and listeners.14
It is questionable, of course, whether this standard for censor-
ship could pass constitutional muster in the United States.15 Never-
theless, the appellant did not directly attack the ordinance. Rather,
"the appellant, comparing the film to a book, seems to plead.. . a
violation ... of Article 3 of the Constitution of Zurich which guaran-
tees liberty of opinion."' 6 The judges impatiently rejected this argu-
ment:
As the Tribunal Federal has declared on repeated occasions,
a general police regulation of industry, decreed to safeguard pub-
lic order ... cannot be attacked because it transgresses the guaran-
tee of another constitutional liberty (liberty of conscience and
belief, liberty of the press, liberty of association and of assembly).
It is the same for liberty of opinion which is only an extension of
liberty of the press and other means of expression. 17
The rationale underlying this principle is quite clear: The con-
stitution does indeed guarantee liberty of religion, for instance,
but a person could not be allowed to pollute the air nor murder his
children in the name of some religious conviction, no matter how
sincere he might possibly be. Likewise, if civil authorities were to
judge that a written work constituted a danger to the public wel-
fare, the author should not be allowed to advance freedom of the
press or freedom of opinion as a barrier against its legal prescription.
At first blush, this seems to be totally inconsistent with the situa-
tion in the United States. But it must be remembered that the
Swiss are highly community conscious, revere tradition, and faith-
fully abide to democratic decisions. They are not libertarians in
their view of first amendment freedoms and do not accept the thesis
that the great guarantees give any person a license to subvert the
1 Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fkdlral, March 3,
1954, at 8 (Swit.).
"I See, e.g., Holmby Prods., Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870, reversing mem. 177 Kan.
728, 282 P.2d 412 (1955) ("tend to debase or corrupt morals'); Superior Films, Inc. v.
Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954), reversing mem. 159 Ohio St. 315, 112
N.E.2d 311 (1953) ("immoral and harmful"); Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of
the Univ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954), reversing mem. 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953)
("tend to corrupt morals"); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) ("prejudicial to the
best interests of the people').
16 Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F4d~ral, March 3,




established order as determined by long tradition and community
decision. In other words, the Swiss never forget that "the people,"
as well as the isolated individual, also have liberties, which ought
not be sacrificed on the altar of devotion to the claims of every
parvenu. To cite one example: In accordance with ageless tradition
and local desires, religious instruction is given in every school. No
child may be obligated to follow such instruction, but this freedom
from religion would never be conceived of as a license for one per-
son to restrict the liberty of others to opt for this kind of training.
For the Swiss, it is not only a question of the liberty of the com-
munity pitted against the nonconformist; it is, rather, the 'liberty
of the one versus that of a multitude of individuals expressing
themselves in a collective fashion. The constitution enshrines both
freedoms in article 49: religious conscience is guaranteed as well
as parental rights in the education of children.
Hence it is easy to see, as will be further developed below, why
the Swiss tolerate a higher degree of censorship by the cantons than
is allowed to local communities in the United States. Nevertheless,
the interest of the individual, as we shall see, is one factor affecting
censorship decisions, and a basis for comparative analysis thus re-
mains.
B. Nudist Films
Werner Kunz is a Swiss promoter of nudist films. In April 1960
the Conseil d'Etat of the Canton of Geneva reluctantly granted him
a permit for a movie entitled "Nous irons t l'ile du Levant" (We
Will Go to the Isle of Levant).18 The Isle is a well-known camp for
nudists in France. The Council limited the showing to those over
eighteen and remarked that it was reserving its judgment "in re-
gard to all nature or nudist films which might be presented to it"
in the.future.
Three months later the Police Department banned two other
movies of Kunz: "Vacances Naturistes" (Vacations for Naturists)
and "Naturists dans la Neige" (Naturists in the Snow). The pro-
hibition rested on article 41 of a Geneva regulation concerning
places where public performances may be given. The pertinent
part forbids "performances contrary to morals and public order,
Is See Kunz contre Conseil dEtat, Tribunal Fdral, Dec. 7, 1960, at 2 (Swit.).
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notably those which present bloody acts or those which are of a
nature to suggest, to provoke or to glorify criminal or unlawful
acts."' 9
In upholding this ban, the Council of Geneva-its collegiate
executive-affirmed that the films in question served as propaganda
for naturism, which "in the present state of public opinion . . . is
contrary to the views of the great majority of the population of the
people of Geneva. '20 Consequently, "it would not conform to pub-
lic opinion to permit the showing of these films." 2 1
The Tribunal Federal noted first22 the power of the cantons to
regulate "trade and industry and taxation thereof,"23 and continued:
Thus it is solely a question of discovering if the regulation has
been applied in the instant case in a manner conforming to the
Constitution. The Tribunal Federal can review this question only.
under the narrow angle of Article 4 of the Constitution [arbitrary
and unequal treatment]. It ought to be all the more restrained
inasmuch as in this matter it acknowledges the broad power of
judgment [vesting] in cantonal authorities, and it does not inter-
vene unless these authorities have manifestly abused their preroga-
tives.24
But after thus professing abnegation, the Tribunal went on to say:
The problem being thus circumscribed, the Tribunal -Federal
has not to offer its judgment about the doctrine of naturism
itself and about the comportment of its adepts in places which are
reserved for the cantons. Its sole duty is to investigate whether or
not it is contrary to Article 4 of the Constitution to consider as
i, Jbid.
-
0 Id. at 2-3.
'
1 Id. at 3.2
-Actually, Kunz' first argument was that the Council's action was arbitrary and
thus infringed the equal protection clause of article 4 of the federal constitution be-
cause the Council had allegedly upheld the ban of the Police Department without
citing the text of any law and without stating the precise legal provisions with which
the films collided. Id. at 5-6. The Tribunal answered that if the law had required
Geneva's Council of State to be more precise in citing chapter and article, then
"perhaps" its omission to do so might constitute a violation of article 4. But there
was no such obligation. Moreover, continued the Tribunal, it was clear beyond any
doubt that the Council intended to uphold the prohibition as formulated by the
Police Department, i.e., a ban grounded upon article 41 of Geneva's regulation of
movie houses prohibiting performances "of a nature to suggest, to provoke or to
glorify criminal or offensive acts." The Tribunal did, however, suggest that the
Council would be better advised to explicate itself more precisely as to which part of
article 41 was involved. Ibid.
Swiss CONsr. 1874, art. 31.
24 Kunz contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F~d~ral, Dec. 7, 1960, at 7-8 (Swit.).
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contrary to public order and morality cinematographic strips
which permit the public at large to see naturists put their convic-
tions into practice.25
This really seems to be an avowal of something less than ab-
solute judicial self-denial, and thus emulates the usual approach of
American courts to legislative judgments. Geneva's Council of
State had already expressed its mind on the subject: naturism was
contrary to current public opinion and to the views of the majority,
and therefore films of propaganda for its cause should not be per-
mitted.26 The Tribunal Federal confessed its lack of authority to
challenge the first part of this judgment of the Council; certainly
it had no duty to question public opinion and to put any judicial
stamp of approval-even provisionary approval-on naturism. But
it would assume the duty of investigating whether or not the second
judgment of the Council collided with the equality clause of article 4
of the constitution. Its investigation and conclusions are expressed
thus:
The film entitled "Vacances Naturistes" includes a part devoted
to the Ile de Sylt and which, for the most part, presents the
ordinary holidays of numberless tourists at the seashore, and
briefly, at the end, the beach reserved for naturists. Three other
portions show nature centers in England ... and in France ....
Insofar as nudists are concerned, the actors wear tights or are
photographed in such a manner that their sex parts are not vis-
ible. They move about within a framework which is essentially
that of nature (vast prairies, beaches, the sea) and with such their
nudity is not out of harmony. Their postures are not questionable
from a sexual standpoint.27
The Tribunal seems, indeed, to be giving its personal opinion
on the harmlessness of the film "Vacances Naturistes," and thus to
be laying down its own standard of what may be constitutionally
banned. On the other hand, the Tribunal further stated:
It is true that the simple expectation of seeing in a film naked men
and women can be a natural attraction for a certain type of spec-
tator impelled by an unhealthy curiosity. From this point of view,
Article 41 would perhaps permit authorities to intervene ....28
25 Id. at 8.
26 Id. at 2-3.




Thus it is unclear whether the Tribunal would constitutionally
overturn the judgment of Geneva's Council of State because of
disagreement on the harmful effects of the movie. This uncertainty
was not resolved in the case, because the Tribunal struck down the
ban on other grounds, to be discussed later.29
The Tribunal next turned its attention to "Naturistes dans la
Neige."
This film represents the frolicking of four young naked women in
the snow. The impression gotten from it is different from that
made by the other two films. Whereas, in them, there is a certain
rapport between the nudity of the actors and the framework in
which they find themselves, the gambolings of naked women in the
snow awakens a feeling of something contrary to nature, and the
scenery presented on the screen appears to serve only as a pretext
to display to the spectator naked women in most sundry positions.
In the other two films the varying landscapes are relatively un-
known to the average spectator and offer to them alone a certain
interest. The mountain scenes which "Naturistes dans la Neige"
present are on the contrary so familiar to an inhabitant of this
country that the only interest of the film strip rests in the naturist
part of it.30
This distinction drawn by the Tribunal between the two films
may appear exceedingly ingenuous: the Swiss are so jaded by their
own mountain scenery that they could only have eyes for the naked
women, but English countryside is so alluring that they wouldn't
see the nudes for the trees!
Thus it is difficult to determine whether the Tribunal was strain-
ing more to upset part of the decision of the Conseil d'Etat or more
to uphold part of it, and what, if any, constitutional standards it
may have been applying. In any case the Tribunal concluded thus:
The appellant is not able to complain of unequal treatment. The
differences cited above are ... sufficiently accentuated so that the
film "Naturistes dans la Neige" can reasonably be considered as
apt to awaken, especially in young movie-goers, an unhealthy
curiosity and, thus, to jeopardize morals and public order. Conse-
quently a prohibition of its presentation is not manifestly un-
warranted in virtue of Article 41 [of Geneva's ordinance on public
performances]. 31
' See text accompanying note 99 infra.
:0 Kunz contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fd6ral, Dec. 7, 1960, at 10 (Swit.).
8 I d. at 10-11.
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Whatever one may say about the meaningfulness of the distinctions
made by the Tribunal between the two films, it is clear that the
judges have indicated they are fully aware of the many various
and delicate factors which must be taken into consideration before
passing judgment on whether and to what extent movies impinge
upon public morals. And from the following cases it will become
clear beyond doubt that the high tribunal thinks the weighing of
these facts is a duty best reserved to local authorities.
C. Further Decisions
In 1961, the Tribunal reviewed the film "Plein Soleil" (Bright
Sun).32 The production had been prohibited in the canton of
Neuchatel as being "contrary to morals, cynical, particularly sug-
gestive in the manner of presenting the premeditation of crimes
and their execution. ' 13  The Department of Police issued its ban
under a 1929 decree of the cantonal Conseil d'Etat forbidding "pub-
lic performances contrary to morality or public order, especially
those which are by their nature apt to suggest or provoke criminal
and unlawful acts."34
In upholding the action of the Neuchatel authorities, the Tri-
bunal made several comments which merit recording here.
According to modern ideas, the police power is limited to the main-
tenance of public order; it has for its mission protecting against
troubles which unlimited liberty would involve; in this respect it
has its right to take measures appropriate to safeguard morality,
tranquility, security and public well-being.
Thus the authority, in assisting parents and the school, must
take into account, in authorizing the showing of films, the age of
spectators; often the health of employers of the cinema branch will
not be irrelevant; other measures will focus on the public in
general.3 5
The Tribunal then spoke of the large discretionary power which
must vest in local authorities.
In the first place, the maintenance of order and public morality
belongs to the cantons; in charging themselves with it, they have
also every latitude possible within the framework of the constitu-
32 Sphinx-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal FMdral, Jan. 6, 1961, at 2
(Swit.).
33 Ibid.
34 See id. at 2.
"I Id. at 5.
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dons and the laws. In the second place, the demands of order and
public morality vary freely according to circumstances and local
opinions; federal law would not be able to trace uniform limits
between that which is permissible and that which is not; it matters
little, in this respect, what is the regulation laid down outside
of a particular canton. The domain of the cinema, finally, presents
such particularities that the showing of a film, more than other
public performances, is subject to varied and contingent eval-
uations.36
In the same year, in Filmklub Lucerne contre Conseil d'Etat,87
the Tribunal upheld another ban, once again making a number of
deferential gestures in the direction of local governmental authority.
For example, the Tribunal said it would not go into a detailed
analysis of the cantonal law in question, for
the Tribunal Federal is not commissioned to play the role of super
authority for cinema censors, nor to take the steps necessary to
maintain public order; this in the first place is the task incumbent
upon the authorities of the cantons, which enjoy a broad measure
of liberty of action and of judgment. In addition, the opinions as
to what constitutes a menace for public order and in particular
for morals, and views as to means for their protection, depend for
the most part upon given local data and dominant political and
religious ideas, [facts] which stand in opposition to the setting up
of broad and uniform standards for the whole of Switzerland. 38
D. "The Nudist Story"
"The Nudist Story" was a film banned in Geneva in 1963 under
the same ordinance mentioned above. This prohibition was upheld
by the Tribunal Federal in Regina-Film contre Conseil d'Etat.3 9
In justifying the ban placed upon the movie, Geneva's Council
of State had declared that since its authorization of "Nous irons It
l'ile du Levant," and since the public showing of "Vacances
Naturistes"-by Tribunal decree-it had become evident that stricter
control over movies was called for. More specifically, the Council
was now "confirmed" in "the idea" that there was "a certain public,
composed especially of young people" which was seeking "in nudist
shows... sexual excitement undesirable from the point of view of
:
6 d. at 8.
7 Tribunal F&dral, July 12, 1961, 87 (.) Arrts du Tribunal F~ddral 117 (1962)
(swit.).
:'Jd. at 119.
0 Tribunal F&hUral, Sept. 25, 1963 (Swit.).
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public morality." 40 The Tribunal accepted this reasoning and re-
jected Regina's request that the movie's exhibition be allowed in
Geneva.41
In reading the opinion of the Tribunal, one notices that it
abounds with professions of restraint and deference to the judgment
of local authorities. When regulating commerce in order to protect
morality and public order, the cantons are not to go beyond what
is strictly necessary, but "the Tribunal Federal will not review their
decision in this regard except in a case of arbitrariness and manifest
error."42 More explicitly, in its judgments of films, "the Tribunal
Federal will uphold the opinion of cantonal authorities as long as it
is not evidently false or arbitrary.' 43
Appellant asserted that in authorizing the film "Nous irons h
l'ile du Levant" in April 1960, the Council had shown it did not
consider nudism as something contrary to the morals of the people
of Geneva. 44 But the judges accepted the Council's subsequent act
of repentance and firm purpose of amendment:
The cantonal authority has explained itself: . . . in authorizing
the film "We Will Go to the Isle of Levant," it did not recognize
the unhealthy attraction which nature films exercise over youth.
[ . . Ihis argument justifies a change in administrative prac-
tice.45
Regina-Film also argued that there were nudist groups practicing
their cult in Geneva, and by tolerating them, the Council of State
had admitted that this practice is compatible with morality.4 Thus,
appellant concluded, it was arbitrary to forbid all propaganda in
favor of nudism. The Tribunal rejected this contention:
The cantonal authority does indeed speak of nudism as being a
method of life contrary to our mores, and this scarcely accords
with the activity which nudist groups seem to carry on in a legal
fashion in the Canton of Geneva. Nonetheless, the film "The
Nudist Story" has been banned not solely because it favors a move-
40 See id. at 2-3.111d. at 9.
* "21d. at 4.
,13 1d. at 5. "It is of no importance that the practice of Geneva's Council of State
differs from that of other governments, for it belongs to the Cantonal authorities to
exercise the police power in their' own cantons." Id. at 7.
"Id. at 8.




ment contrary to mores but rather and especially because in itself
it is an offense to morals and public order. Now as this results
from the preceding considerations, this argument is solidly
grounded and is sufficient in itself to justify the decision which
is attacked. Thus, 'the complaint of arbitrariness rings untrue.4 7
It is important to note, however, that the Tribunal did indulge
in some review and independent determinations. This is shown
by the manner in which it met appellant's charges that another film-
"Nights of Paris"-revealed seven methods of undressing, 8 and that
cabarets and night clubs presented displays similar to those in "The
Nudist Story. ' 49 The Tribunal observed that "Nights of Paris"
was authorized before the new policy of stricter control had been
adopted, and significantly added that the strip-tease scenes were not
its essential element, 50 whereas in "The Nudist Story" the nudists
played the principal role,51 and people appeared completely -naked
from beginning to end of the film.52
As for the cabarets and night clubs, the Tribunal underscored
the fact that "the dancing had only a limited clientele and the indi-
vidual was for the most part warned in advance, while the cinema
drew upon an extremely vast and unsuspecting general public."ta
There are solid grounds for distinguishing between a large cinema
appealing to the public at large and the intimacy of a cabaret with
its limited number of patrons. It is somewhat more difficult to ac-
cept the suggestion that many, if any, people fall into a nudist movie
by accident or drop in casually under the false impression that they
are about to see Mickey Mouse.5
Nonetheless, the Tribunal did apply its own judgment to the
film. But it is inescapable that the tone of the whole opinion is one
of deference to local authorities in matters of cinema censorship.
S7 Ibid.
,8 Id. at 8.
49 Id. at 3.
30 Id. at 8.
51 Ibid.
52 Id. at 6-7.
58 Id. at 3.
"It would have been much more apposite to underscore the difference be-
tween taking no action against the cultists and positively authorizing a nudist
film. The state has no obligation to legislate against every evil. Compare Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Indeed, political prudence
frequently dictates tolerance of activities contrary to accepted moral standards of a
community when carried on privately or in small groups and in such a manner as to
cause no substantial harm to the common good.
Vol. 1966: 633]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
E. "Girls of the Sun God"
This same spirit of restraint motivated a decision by the Tri-
bunal in May of 1963 in the case of Kunz contre Conseil d'Etat.5r
In upholding the Council's ban on "Les Filles du Dieu Soleil"
(Girls of the Sun God), the court offered the following comments:
Public morality is essentially an element of order. In this domain,
the responsibility in the first instance rests upon the cantonal au-
thority which is, better than any other, in a position to judge
local circumstances.5 6
The authorities in Geneva are satisfied with asserting that a cer-
tain public, made up especially of young people, go there [to nudist
films] to find unhealthy thrills .... There is no need to prove
such an assertion.57
The appellants reproach . . . the Conseil d'Etat for having ad-
vanced its new argument without being convinced of it, solely to
satisfy the demands laid down by the Tribunal Federal in its
decree of December 7, 1960. This complaint is manifestly devoid
of all justification; it is even temerious.58
As to the precise reason for banning "Girls of the Sun God,"
the Tribunal echoed the conclusion of the Council of State that this
was "a film constituting clear propaganda for nudism which is
contrary to our mores and offensive to a great majority of the popu-
lation."5 9
F. A Summary
This brief review of the relevant Swiss cases clearly indicates
that the Tribunal Federal's approach is quite different from that
of the prevailing opinions of the United States Supreme Court.
First, of course, the Tribunal has not taken the definitional course
which the Supreme Court has developed: that which is "obscene"
is not within the ambit of the first amendment and therefore is not
entitled to constitutional protection. Rather, the Tribunal assumes
constitutional protection and goes on to "balance" much the way
that the Supreme Court does in the ordinary first amendment case.
Secondly, it is obvious that movies are not considered "speech,"
5 Tribunal F0tral, May 1, 1963, 89(.) Arrfts du Tribunal FVldral 166 (Swit.).
58 Id. at 169.5 7 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
09 Id. at 166.
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and hence do not merit preferred constitutional protection. ° Thus,
when the "speech" in a movie comes in conflict with a valid regu-
lation under the police power, the latter, if reasonable, will pre-
vail. In addition, the scope of permissible police power regulation
is somewhat broader than would be allowable in the United States.
Thirdly, the Tribunal Federal exercises great restraint in judg-
ing cantonal censorship. This is probably a result of its deep re-
spect for Swiss federalism, consideration for community standards,
appreciation of cantonal differences, and regard for the judgment
of local authority.61 Even the factual determinations of these au-
thorities on possible disturbing effects which might occur from the
showing of a particular film are seldom questioned.
The Tribunal feels that any attempt to impose uniform laws
throughout the Republic would represent sheer folly. 2 The result
is that twenty-five different jurisdictions'" are authorized to legislate
for the cinema in a country of only five and one-half million people
living in an area one-two-hundredths the size of the United States.
The Tribunal Federal has not, however, totally abdicated its
position as a protector of individual rights. It stands ready to re-
verse cantonal decisions which constitute unequal treatment or
which represent unreasonable and arbitrary action. 4 This "reason-
ableness" test can be illustrated by rulings that the cantons might
prohibit the showing of movies on the Sundays of Advent, but not
during prolonged periods of time-for example, all of Advent or
60 Movies do not fall within the protection of any specific constitutional provision.
See part IV D of this article infra.
"For an illustration of how extensive this deference can be, see note 22 supra.
See also Rey contre Ministre public, Tribunal Fdddral, Dec. 3, 1963, [1954] Journal
des Tribunaux 149 (Swit.), where the Tribunal reproached but did not reverse
the cantonal court for failing to specify which pictures in a magazine were obscene
after admitting that some were not obscene.
"Compare the view of Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 458
(1966): "The varying conditions across the country, the range of views on the
need and reasons for curbing obscenity, and the traditions of local self-government
in matters of public welfare all favor a far more flexible attitude in defining the
bounds for the States."
"'There are only twenty-two cantons, but three of them have split into "half"
cantons, each with its own parliament.
6, Compare the view of Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 458 (1966):
"From my standpoint, the Fourteenth Amendment requires of a State only that it
apply criteria rationally related to the accepted notion of obscenity and that it
reach results not wholly out of step with current American standards. . . . The lati-
tude which I believe the States deserve cautions against any federally imposed
formula listing the exclusive ingredients of obscenity and fixing their proportions."
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Lent; 5 the Tribunal has simply concluded that while the one regu-
lation is reasonable, the other is patently an unreasonable restraint
of the cinema industry.
The fact that the Tribunal does and will impose limitations on
the breadth of censorship action taken by the cantons gives a com-
parative study great validity. While the general approach and atti-
tude of the Tribunal contain significant differences from those of
the Supreme Court, the differences fall more into the "where to
draw the line" category than the "how to draw the line" category.
In relation to where the line should be drawn, several other fac-
tors should be borne in mind in making this comparative study.
First, the danger of a criminal prosecution for obscene movies is
quite small in Switzerland, and hence more arbitrariness will be
tolerated. Secondly, the film industry in Switzerland is still largely
undeveloped. Most of the films under consideration are produced
outside of the country, and a proportionate part of the profits are
thus not available to the Swiss economy. One can only speculate
as to the extent of the effect these and other like factors have on
censorship law-but surely the existence of an effect cannot be
doubted.
With these considerations in mind, let us delve into a com-
parison of Swiss and American law.
III
COMPARATIVE PROBLEMS
Since it appears that the Tribunal Federal's control over movie
censorship is not wholly unlike the function performed by the
United States Supreme Court, but rather differs only in the degree
and particulars in which that control is exercised, an excellent basis
is afforded for comparative analysis of the manner by which various
particularized censorship problems are solved. This section will
concentrate on those problems which have been raised in both coun-
tries and which therefore lend themselves to direct comparison.
05 Siegried contre Vaud, Tribunal Fdral, Feb. 5, 1915, 41 (1.) Arrats du Tribunal
F&ral 40 (Swit.); Morandini contre Luzern, Tribunal Fdral, Sept. 15, 1933, 59 (.)
Arrets du Tribunal FMl&al 107 (Swit.); Held contre NeuchAtel, Tribunal Fdral,
Nov. 19, 1914, 40 (.) Arrits du Tribunal F&lral 479 (Swit.); Note, 49 Schweizerisches
Zentralblatt Filr Staats-und Gemeindeverwaltung 303 (1948). Thus the Tribunal has
ruled that it is an unreasonable restraint of trade to force cinemas to close for long
periods or for several days a week even if the motive is a noble one, as, for example,




Swiss thinking on prior restraint starts from the premise that
wide latitude should be given local authorities to exercise the police
power. This factor, combined with the Tribunal's somewhat re-
laxed attitude toward the importance of "speech," leads in-
evitably to the conclusion that prior restraint is an acceptable mode
of censorship.
The [public] authority can protect public order, in the area of
cinema representations, in diverse manners; thus it may set up a
system of prior censorship or, in case of necessity, forbid a showing
even after the beginning of a performance. 6
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has unanimously indicated
in Freedman v. Maryland67 that prior restraint will be tolerated
only if careful procedural safeguards are provided.
B. Scope of Review
One of the most perplexing and yet uhresolved issues which has
faced the Supreme Court is the scope of review which should be
afforded in obscenity cases.68 While the position of the Tribunal
Federal is somewhat clearer, it too is not free from ambiguity.
Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 9 said:
I would commit the enforcement of [the constitutional obscenity
standard] . . . to the appropriate state and federal courts, and I
would accept their judgments . . . limiting myself to a con-
sideration only of whether there is sufficient evidence in the
record .... [P]rotection of society's right to maintain its moral
fiber and the effective administration of justice require that this
Court not establish itself as an ultimate censor .... 70
This statement is quite similar to the Tribunal's words in the
Filmklub Lucerne case:
The Tribunal Federal is not commissioned to play the role of super
authority for cinema censors, nor to take the steps necessary to
maintain public order; this in the first place is the task incumbent
00 Sphinx-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F&Idral, Jan. 6, 1961, at 5
(Swit.). See note 121 infra.
:3 80 U.S. 51 (1965).
8 See generally Comment, The Scope of Supreme Court Review in Obscenity Cases,
1965 DuxE L.J. 596.
-378 U.S. 184 (1964).
10 Id. at 202 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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upon the authorities of the cantons who in fulfilling it enjoy a
broad measure of liberty of action and of judgment. 1
It is probably safe to assume that this statement represents the
view of the Tribunal, and that de novo review, at least to the ex-
tent that it would compel the judges to see the film itself, is not a re-
quirement. This conclusion is muddied slightly, however, by the fact
that in the "White Slavery" case, the Tribunal did watch excerpts
of the film, and then indicated that it could not judge from excerpts
alone whether the film taken as a whole was "improper and cor-
rupting throughout." 72 Does this mean that if the appellant had
shown the Tribunal the entire film, it would have made a judgment
on its propriety?
Whatever may be the answer to that question, the Tribunal
has dearly held that the Councils, appellate bodies themselves, need
not see the film in question en banc. A Council can delegate this
chore to experts or rest its judgment on the opinion of those of its
members deemed most competent in these matters.73
C. Elements of the Obscenity Definition
The Tribunal has not given a definition of "obscenity" in any
of the movie censorship cases. It has defined the term in a slightly
different context, however:
A publication is obscene . . .when, objectively, by its subject
and the fashion of treatment, it is likely to shock sexual decency,
when its end is essentially to arouse the sexual passions, when it
intends no scientific or artistic purposes, and when because
of the method of propaganda and because of the people reached it
threatens to exert a corrupting action on morals.74
This definition is somewhat more extensive than the basic Roth
definition.7 5 It seems to incorporate Roth's "patent offensiveness"
71 Filmklub Lucerne contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F&d6ral, July 12, 1961, 87 (.)
Arrats du Tribunal F&lral 117, 119 (1962) (Swit.).
'12 Gamma-Film. Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Ftdlral, March 3,
1954, at 10-11 (Swit.). The Tribunal does at times ask to view a film in its entirety.
See Sphinx-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F&tdral, Jan. 6, 1961, at S
(Swit.), where the judges viewed two films to make a comparison.
73 Id. at 4, 6-7.
74 A. K. contre Tribune de Police, Tribunal F&lZral, July 7, 1927, 53 (.) Arrts du
Tribunal F&1dral 234 (Swit.). While the Tribunal was here considering literature,
the definition would seem to apply to movies as well.
71 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957): "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
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and "prurient interest" concepts, and goes on to include notions
of "redeeming social value,"76 the method of advertising,77 and a
weighing of the effect on the intended audience.78
1. Taken as a Whole
The Swiss Tribunal agrees with the Supreme Court that a movie
must be judged as a whole, and that a decision on its propriety cannot
be made on the basis of only a few excerpts. 79 It is interesting to note,
however, that this principle frequently seems to work against the
Swiss film exhibitor. Thus, for example, where an appellant at-
tempted to justify a film because it "carried a valuable message,"
and in which the criminal was eventually brought to justice, the
Tribunal stated:
This rectification, accidental and hasty, as though outside the
work, does not erase from the spectator's mind the narration,
which he has just seen, of a perfect crime. Thus it is not un-
reasonable, on the part of the cantonal authorities, to reproach
the banned work as being apt to lead to crime. Such a category
of spectators can easily conclude that with a little more skill, the
hero would have escaped justice; if he fails, it is due to bad luck,
not because of the logical chain of events, according to a natural
result. The Conseil d'Etat might legitimately admit that the moral
justification brought in in the final sequence is not real, is super-
ficial, pure form, and that it does not reverse the thought that the
perfect crime is possible and that it pays off handsomely.80
Another film was prohibited even though it proposed "an end not
immoral or inadmissible. It is sufficient that it presents repeated
scenes which are of a nature to produce . . . injurious effects."8'
70 A majority of the Court does not agree that this is a part of the "obscenity"
definition. See notes 108-10 infra and accompanying text.
77In Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), the Court held that the
method of distribution and advertising is one factor bearing on whether the material
is "obscene."
78 See part III F of this article.
"See, e.g., Regina-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F&t6ral, Sept. 25,
1963, at 8 (Swit.); Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal
FL&1al, March 8, 1954, at 10-11 (Swit.). In Rey contre Ministre public, Tribunal
F6dral, Dec. 3, 1963, [1964] Journal des Tribunaux 149 (Swit.), the Tribunal up-
held a conviction for selling obscene magazines with this observation: "The char-
acterizing of such publications as obscene ought to rest more on the impression
d'ensemble which they awaken in the reader than on such or such detail."
8"Sphinx-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fd&lral, Jan. 6, 1961, at 10
(Swit.). While this case did not involve obscenity, the principle would nevertheless
be clearly applicable.
81 Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F&t6ral, March 3,
1954, at 8 (Swit.).
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2. To the Average Person
Presumably the Tribunal also feels that it is the average member
of the audience who must be considered in judging the propriety
of a film. In a case involving obscene magazines, the Tribunal held
that to apply an obscenity statute it was necessary to consider "not
a particular individual, but the average observer in the milieu of a
given civilization."8 2
3. Patent Offensiveness
The Swiss also seem to apply some sort of a "patent offensive-
ness" standard in judging movies. A film was banned, for example,
because it was "capable of having an unfavorable influence on
morals and of offending the sensibilities of spectators and lis-
teners."83
4. Redeeming Social Value
The concept of "redeeming social value" has also been raised in
Swiss litigation. The Tribunal recognizes that a film may "represent
in a truthful manner historic events or certain personalities" and
that "artistic or historic value [may] . . . compensate in a certain
measure for the boldness of such or such a scene."84 Again, however,
the Tribunal will not be overly tolerant in this respect. The fact
that the film ends in a socially desirable manner will not suffice in
itself to save it from censorship.8 5
In the "White Slavery" case, the appellant argued that his film
served a very good purpose by warning young girls of the evils of
prostitution and putting them on guard against unscrupulous
pimps. 8 Many of the scenes were indeed coarse and brutal, he
admitted, but this promoted his worthy end all the more by exposing
evil in all its stark and ugly realism.8 7 The Tribunal's answer to
these contentions is quite interesting. The court observed that Swiss
" Rey contre Ministre public, Tribunal FVdfral, May 10, 1963, 89 (IV.) Arrts du
Tribunal Fdral 134 (Swit.).8
3Sphinx-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fddral, Jan. 6, 1961, at 10
(Swit.); see text accompanying note 79 supra.
s8 Sphinx-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F&ldral, Jan. 6, 1961, at 12
(Swit.).
85 Id. at 10; Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal FWddral,
March 3, 1954, at 8 (Swit.).
"Oid. at 2-3, 5.
87 Id. at 2, 5.
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girls really didn't need this kind of protection since white slavery
was not a problem of any proportions in the country.8 s This would
seem to indicate that the Swiss will consider "redeeming social
value" in mitigation of a film's offensiveness only if that "value" has
utility in the sense of possessing a causal connection to an existing
problem in Swiss society.
Such an interpretation of "redeeming social value" has not re-
ceived articulation by any Supreme Court Justice. The "utility"
aspect of "value" is perhaps subsumed in the opinions of Justices
Clark 9 and White90 in the "Fanny Hill" case. On the other hand,
it can be argued that "value" is inherently present in art or litera-
ture as an abstract proposition, but to attribute such a view to
Justices Clark and White is somewhat speculative. The most logical
explanation thus seems to be that the "utility" element of "redeem-
ing social value" has simply been overlooked by the Supreme
Court.
D. Contemporary Community Standards
The obscenity test currently applied by the United States Su-
preme Court requires that material be judged according to "con-
temporary community standards," 91 but the meaning of this phrase
has not been agreed upon by a majority of the Court in any case.92
The phrase "contemporary community standards" is given a
literal meaning by the Tribunal. The applicable standards are
clearly "contemporary"-the test is the prevailing moral views of
the community;93 and the Tribunal repeatedly asserts emphatically
that the "community" is a local one:
[C]ircumstances . . . differ from one canton to another.94
[T]he demands of order and public morality vary freely according
to circumstances and local opinions; federal law would not be
able to trace uniform limits between that which is permissible
8 Id. at 9.
so A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 441 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting).
sId. at 460 (White, J., dissenting).
01 See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
02See Comment, 1965 Durra L.J. 596-601.
9' See, e.g., Kunz contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal FRd6ral, Dec. 7, 1960, at 2-3(Svit.).
91 Kunz contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F&f1ral, May 1, 1963, 89 (I.) Arr~ts du
Tribunal Fdral 166, 169 (Swit.).
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and that which is not; it matters little, in this respect, what is the
regulation laid down outside of such or such a canton.95
[O]pinions as to what constitutes a menace for public order and
in particular for morals, and views as to means for their pro-
tection, depend for the most part upon given local data and upon
the dominant political and religious ideas, [facts] which stand in
opposition to the setting up of broad and uniform standards for
the whole of Switzerland.96
E. Comparisons to Other Similar Movies
The New York Court of Appeals held in 1964 that if a book
is no more offensive than other books which have been adjudicated
unobscene by the Supreme Court, then the book under considera-
tion cannot be obscene.97 A New Jersey court has rejected this
"analogy" approach.9
Article 4 of the Swiss constitution includes an equal protection
provision quite similar to the one appearing in the fourteenth
amendment. The Tribunal Federal in the "Vacations for Naturists"
case squarely grounded its reversal of the ban on this movie upon
the equal protection provision.
[T~he Conseil d'Etat cannot forbid the film "Vacances Naturistes"
without violating Article 4 of the Constitution. Indeed, hardly
three months before, it had authorized the showing of the film
"Nous irons t l'ile du Levant." Now in the actual versions of
these two cinematographic strips there are no differences of fact
permitting the authorizing of one and the banning of the other.99
The "analogy" approach thus assumes constitutional status
in Switzerland. It should be carefully noted, however, that this equal
protection argument can be made only it unequal treatment has
been accorded the individual by the same canton: "[A complaint
based on article 4] cannot be formulated successfully, according to
firm court precedent, except by a person who has been legally
treated in an unequal fashion by the same cantonal authority."100
'" Sphinx-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal &ldral, Jan. 6, 1961, at 8
(Swit.).
"' Filmklub Lucerne contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F&ddral, July 12, 1961, 87 (L)
Arr~ts du Tribunal FPddral 117, 119 (1962) (Swit.).
17 Larkin v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 252 N.Y.S.2d 71, 200 N.E.2d 760
(1964).
"G. P. Putnam's Sons v. Callisi, 86 N.J. Super. 82, 205 A.2d 913 (Ch. 1964).
"Kunz contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fdddral, Dec. 7, 1960, at 9 (Swit.).
10 Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F&I-ral, March 3,
1954, at 10 (Swit.).
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In addition, a canton need not consistently maintain the same
policy toward censorship. The censoring body is not eternally bound
by its previous decisions; 101 it is permitted to adopt a stricter stan-
dard. But before doing so, "it would have nonetheless to show some
new circumstances which justify maintaining a more restrictive
practice." If it fails to do so, then it is arbitrary and hence invalid
to ban a movie similar to one previously sanctioned.10 2
A change in censorship policy was clearly shown in the case in-
volving the movie "The Nudist Story." Geneva's Council of State
had expressly stated it was convinced that exhibitions of prior movies
indicated stricter controls over films were necessary. Since the
Council firmly believed that exhibition of these prior movies had in
fact produced a deleterious effect on morals, the change in attitude,
said the Tribunal, was justified. 0 3
In the "White Slavery" case, however, the change in admin-
istrative policy was not so express. In upholding the ban on this
film, the Tribunal noted that the Zurich authorities were apparently
adopting a more severe policy of control in view of certain "odious
crimes" committed in Zurich toward the end of 1951.104 The Tri-
bunal further stated:
Even if one wanted to admit that the Conseil d'Etat had not in-
troduced or consciously confirmed a more severe censorship policy,
it would not follow from this that appellant is able to plead un-
equal treatment. It is natural that the evaluation of films should
be adapted to the circumstances of life and should be modified
during the course of the years. And if, in the concrete case, the
authority in effect applies criteria more rigorous than previously,
one cannot demand, in view of equality of treatment, that it
should alter its views about former decisions, especially since, as
is the case for the Canton of Zurich, the number of films to be
examined each year is very large.1°5
The ease with which the Tribunal will thus apparently "find"
a change in censorship policy diminishes the probability of a suc-
cessful argument based on the equal protection provision. The
probability of success will also depend, of course, on the amount of
101-Kunz contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fdral, Dec. 7, 1960, at 9 (Swit.).
102Id. at 10.
20 Regina-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fdddral, Sept. 25, 1963, at 2-3,
9 (Swit.).




deference the Tribunal will pay to the censoring body's decision.
That great deference will be given is indicated by the following
statement of the Tribunal in the "Bright Sun" case: "It can seriously
be doubted that the constitutional principle of equality of treat-
ment is often applicable in the question of the cinema: there are
hardly two films entirely the same."'10 6
While the scope of protection available to the exhibitor by virtue
of a "similar films" argument based on the equal protection pro-
vision thus seems to be rather narrow,-the fact remains that such a
concept does exist. There is no immediately apparent reason why
such a concept does not likewise exist under the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause. It is true that a factual comparison of
two movies or two books to determine which is "worse" presents
difficult problems of proof. Nevertheless, it seems entirely possible
for an exhibitor in the United States who believes that his film is
no more offensive than one already sanctioned by the censoring
authority to base a forceful argument on the equal protection
clause. Indeed, such an argument would afford an exhibitor the
only avenue of relief if both his film, and the one already sanctioned
were in fact obscene under the constitutional standards developed
by the Supreme Court. 07
F. The Movie's Effect on the Audience
The definitional approach adopted toward obscenity by the
Supreme Court dictates that a determination first be made as to
whether the item in issue is "obscene." If it is, then no first amend-
ment protection is afforded it. According to the plurality opinion
in the most recent Supreme Court case, one element of the obscenity
definition is whether "the material is utterly without redeeming
social value."lOs On the other hand, three of the Justices deny that
this consideration is part of the constitutional test. 00 Among them
100 Sphinx-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal ghdfral, Jan. 6, 1961, at 11
(Swit.).
107 Of course, the possibility that the censoring authority under such an attack
might reverse its sanction of the prior movie should not be overlooked. But compare
Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Ffddral, March 3,
1954, at 11 (Swit.): "[I]f .. . the authority in effect applies criteria more rigorous
than previously, one cannot demand, in view of equality of treatment, that it should
alter its views about former decisions ....
108 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
109 See id. at 441-45 (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 458-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id.
at 460-62 (White, J., dissenting).
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is Justice Clark, who argues that even if the "redeeming social value"
test is part of the obscenity definition, then the inquiry concerning
this element must not merely consider "artistic, literary, and his-
torical qualities," but must also "balance alleged esthetic merit
against the 'harmful consequences that may flow from pornog-
raphy."110
If the possibility that salacious material may produce harmful
effects on the audience is found to be a relevant consideration, there
are two methods by which this factor might be injected into the
constitutional structure. It could be subsumed into the obscenity
definition itself, thus further befouling an already befouled prob-
lem. Or it could be considered separately: once the material has been
found to be unobscene, the effect on the audience would be one
factor to be considered in an ordinary first amendment analysis.
if a balancing approach were utilized, the restriction on speech
would be weighed against the gravity and probability of the sup-
posed harmful effects.
The Swiss have faced the problem of effect on the audience,
and their basic position seems to be in agreement with Justice Clark.
Thus, when an appellant pointed out that the critic's reviews of his
film had been "laudatory," the Tribunal noted that "this, insofar
as it appraises the quality of the work, looks only at the technical
and artistic aspect; now it is not this which is decisive in the view-
point of the police administration . . .. ""
Indeed, the effect on the audience is perhaps the most important
factor considered by the Swiss in their censorship approach:
That which ought to determine the attitude of the public authority
is the probable subjective reaction of the ordinary public in the
cinema hall. It varies according to many factors, among which, the
age of the viewer and the times and locale of the presentation
appear to be the most important. Thus it is that in a period of a
recrudence of crime (or of certain crimes) the public authority
will show itself more demanding in respect to such a category
of films. 112
210 Id. at 451 (Clark, J., dissenting).
121Sphinx-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F~dtral, Jan. 6, 1961, at 10
(Swit.).
12 ILd. at 6; see note 13 supra.
It is not the details of a magazine but rather the total impression on the reader
which -is decisive in adjudging obscenity. Rey contre Ministre public, Tribunal
FP&'ral, Dec. 3, 1963, [1964] Journal des Tribunaux 149 (Swit.).
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Censorship authorities are allowed to adjust their standards of con-
trol over the films submitted to them according to the circumstances
of the times. When certain "odious crimes" were committed in
Zurich, for example, a stricter policy of censorship was justified.113
All of this raises the interesting question of what factual burden
of proof should be placed on the censoring authority to show that
its action is reasonably calculated to meet some recognizable public
interest and that some rational connection exists between the censor-
ship policy and the furthering of that public interest. Authority in
this country certainly has given no uniform answer to whether there
is any relationship between pornography and antisocial conduct.114
A concomitant problem is what effect legislative or quasi-legislative
findings should have on judicial inquiry into the factual under-
pinnings of such findings. The Swiss have obviously decided these
questions in favor of deference to local judgments; it is uncertain
whether this policy would be followed in the United States.
A more specific problem also arises in the area of the effect of
salacious material on the audience. The holding in Ginzburg v.
United States,"I5 as well as dicta from that and other cases, indicates
that the identity of the audience toward which the material is di-
rected bears on whether censorship will be allowed. Thus it is not
impossible that the Court may decide that a certain item can be
constitutionally banned from a showing or distribution only to
certain groups, or that what is "obscenity" in some circumstances
may not be "obscenity" under others. Such a holding would be in
accord with statements by the Swiss Tribunal. For example, the
Tribunal has indicated that the permissible limits of regulation for
a movie are different than for a night club. 116 Likewise, the Tri-
bunal has raised a possible distinction based on the age of the
audience:
One might wonder . . if, insofar as the Conseil d'Etat [in this
case] intends 'to protect youth only, it should not, in order to
I' Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal FVd'ral,
March 3, 1954, at 11 (Swit.).
:11 For an indication of the effect of this disagreement on the Supreme Court, com-
pare A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 432-33 & n.11 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring), with id. at 451-53
(Clark, J., dissenting).
15 883 U.S. 463 (1966). See also in this connection Butler v. Michigan, 852 U.S. 580
(1957).




be consistent with the principle of proper proportion, limit itself
to the banning of the film for persons who have not reached
a certain age." 7
It was not necessary to answer this question in the instant case,
because the appellant had not raised the issue.'"' But it is not at all
clear that the appellant would have been successful even if it had.
The censoring authority in the case had specifically grounded its ban
on the danger the film posed for youth.1 9 Nevertheless, the Tri-
bunal blithely continued:
However, it is the possibility given the general public of freely
seeing nudists that the Conseil d'Etat is against. But nudists ap-
pear on the screen from beginning to end of this litigious film.
Thus the entire film can indeed be forbidden. 120
Perhaps the Tribunal has shifted its ground for affirmance; but
if it has not, it seems to be applying a tight series of syllogisms:
Young people need protection against corrupting influences. Adults
who see nudist films could become a corrupting influence. Ergo,
nudist films should not be shown to adults.
This reasoning is not wholly without merit, however. Given the
goal of protection of youth, the inquiry in the United States, at
least, would be whether this means of effectuating that goal is
sufficiently rational to allow suppression of the movie-whether
subsumed under the "obscenity" definition or via an ordinary first
amendment inquiry.
IV
OTHER ASPECTS OF Swiss CENSORSHIP LAW
Several other elements of Swiss censorship law have no directly
analogous counterpart in American law, but are nevertheless relevant
to a comparative study. These will be discussed below.
11 7 Id. at 7; see note 82 supra and accompanying text.
In Sutz contre Zurich, Tribunal F~d&al, May 13, 1925, 51 (I.) Arr&s du Tri-
bunal Fddlral 37 (Swit.), the Tribunal sustained cantonal jaws forbidding the
showing of films to certain age groups. Nearly every canton classifies each film into
age requirements of over eighteen, over sixteen, over twelve, or over seven years of age.
Admission must be denied to those who do not qualify.
218 Regina-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Frd&al, Sept. 25, 1963, at
7 (Swit.).
111 See id. at 9.




The method of advertising and distributing the material, the
Supreme Court has said, "is relevant to the application of the Roth
test."1' 1 If the material is being "pandered," it is more likely to be
"obscene." 122 This issue has arisen in a related context in Swiss
law, and the following paragraphs show the extent of cantonal
control which has been deemed permissible.
Fribourg, a canton just north of Geneva and Vaud, is known
for censorship laws somewhat more restrictive than those in many
of the other states in the Swiss Confederation. The film "Nous
irons File du Levant" was banned in 1960 by its control board,12
permitted in the cantons which flanked its border. But Werner
Kunz, the enterprising promoter of naturist spectacles, decided that
if the nudists could not go to Fribourg, Fribourg would be made
to go to the nudists.124 He accordingly arranged to show the banned
film in Payerne, a small town lying just south inside the boundaries
of the canton of Vaud, where the movie had been authorized. Three
days before opening night, he had advertisements stating "we will
go" deposited in letter boxes in Fribourg's capital city. The hand-
bills gave the hours of the showings as well as the hours of trains
leaving for. Payerne. And, of course, Kunz made the forbidden fruit
all the more appetizing by underscoring the fact that the film was
banned in Fribourg.
Fribourg retaliated to the challenge by fining Kunz 400 francs
($92). The legal basis for such punishment was a law forbidding
films contrary to public order and good morals, plus an ordinance
prohibiting all advertisements of the same character.1 25
121 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 471 (1966).
The Swiss high court has ruled that the cantons may ban all cinema advertising
near schools. Georgopoulos contre Bfile-Ville, Tribunal F~ddral, Oct. 28, 1927, 53 (1.)
Arrits du Tribunal FRdfal 265 (Swit.). But it has said that prior censorship of film
ads placed an unreasonable burden on the cinema industry. Cin6-Spectacles S. A.
contre Gen~ve, Tribunal F4d~ral, Oct. 22, 1952, 78 (L) Arrets du Tribunal FAddral 278
• (Swit.). The court noted that cantons could achieve the same end by prosecuting
offenders for printing immoral or obscene material. The judges observed that this
ruling was not inconsistent with its allowance of compulsory prior review of the films
themselves. See note 66 supra and accompanying text; note 139 infra.
122 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465-66, 470-71 (1966).
122 See Kunz contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fdral, Sept. 20, 1961, [1962] Journal





In his appeal before the Tribunal Federal, Kunz argued that
the punishment meted out to him was an unconstitutional restraint
of trade and commerce, guaranteed by article 31 of the constitu-
tion, and that it violated the equal protection clause of article 4.126
The Tribunal carefully detailed the extent of protection afforded
by these guarantees. It noted that commerce could be regulated for
the common good only insofar as necessary and that the cantons
could not pass discriminatory laws against businesses located beyond
its own borders.127
The judges also observed that a canton could not forbid its
citizens the right to travel beyond its frontiers, even to preserve them
from physical or moral evil.128 This raises an interesting point:
Kunz had not urged the people of Fribourg to do anything illegal,
and there is no suggestion in the Tribunal's opinion that the hand-
bill was in any way salacious or improper. In effect, Kunz merely
urged people to exercise a constitutional right in Fribourg-travel
to a neighboring canton-and to perform another perfectly legal act
in the canton of Vaud-view a film authorized by law in that canton.
Moreover, as the Tribunal pointed out, its previous decisions had
recognized that "in general . . . the interests of a canton are suffi-
ciently protected" against possible abuses of an enterprise when
that enterprise has been authorized in its home canton.129
All this being said, the Tribunal proceeded to uphold Fribourg's
right to punish Kunz by fine. This conclusion followed once the
Tribunal had set forth its major premise: the general task of cinema
censorship is to keep the public from seeing films deemed dan-
gerous. 30 In brief, the rationale was "let the end be legitimate ...
and all means which are appropriate ... are constitutional."'' a In
putting flesh on this skeleton, the Tribunal made the following
pertinent observations:
The chore of the movie censor of the cantons is to protect public
order and good morals. To this end, the censor strives to keep
from the public films which, by reason of the scenes produced
or of the manner in which they are presented, are apt to disturb
1 20 Id. at 340.
227Id. at 343-44.129 Id. at 345.1 29 Id. at 346.
130 Id. at 345.
231 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 420 (1819).
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the internal or external peace of individuals, to offend their
moral or religious sentiments, to exercise an evil effect or to ex-
cite to crime.'3 2
As to Kunz's handbill, the Tribunal continued:
Consequently to oppose this kind of advertisement constitutes
an appropriate means for attaining the end which the censor has
proposed to himself. If the canton were not able to act against
this ad, the efficacy of its control would be seriously compromised
by the easy means of communication existing amongst the dif-
ferent cantonal States. Once cantonal authorities have arrived
at the conclusion that a film puts public order and good morals
in danger ... they ought therefore to be able to take care that
this danger does not reach, from outside [its boundaries] an im-
portant portion of the population. 3 3
The Tribunal referred to a 1944 decision upholding a law of a
canton which forbade newspaper advertisements for unlicensed
doctors. 3 4 In this case, the Tribunal Federal had justified the law
as a legitimate defense of its own citizens-and of its own doctors-
against those cantons which did not have high medical standards;
otherwise the standard in all of the cantons might be reduced to the
lowest common denominator. 33
The Tribunal admitted that generally speaking the laws of one
canton would afford sufficient protection for all people, but it added
an important qualification:
However, it [the Tribunal] makes an exception for the hypothesis
where police prescriptions of the different cantons impose dif-
ferent regulations for the same public performance. This is the
case for the censor. 36
What follows is highly significant:
The question of knowing when public order and particularly
good morals are put in danger and how it is fitting to protect these
legal goods (ces biens juridiques), depends in a large measure
on local conditions and on the dominant opinions within the
132 Kunz contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fddral, Sept. 20, 1961, [1962] Journal des
Tribunaux S40, 345. (Swit.).
233 ibid.
is' Ibid.135 Ulrich contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal FYddral, April 3, 1944, 70 (.) Arr~ts du
Tribunal FYdral 71 (Swit.).
136 Kunz contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F4ddral, Sept. 20, 1961, [1962] Journal des
Tribunaux 340, 346 (Swit.).
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political and religious domain, in such a way that the decision
of one canton is not necessarily valid for another canton.18 7
But if a canton is permitted to forbid Kunz's handbills, should
they not also be permitted to exclude from their borders newspapers
from other cantons carrying the same message by way of an advertise-
ment? The Tribunal was aware of the possibility, but refused to be
frightened by "the parade of the horribles." It merely observed,
in passing, that "it wasn't the place here for examining how the diffi-
culty would be solved."'' 38 In typical Swiss fashion, the judges
indicated that they would cross that bridge when they reached it.
It seems safe to say that they would judge this to be an "unreason-
able" restraint of trade and of the press; the regulation under con-
sideration now, on the other hand, simply seemed "reasonable,"
B. Alternative Means
One factor bearing on constitutional issues in the United States
which has assumed increasing importance recently is the availability
of alternative means to accomplish some legitimate social goal-
alternative means which do not tread so heavily on individual rights
as the mean chosen. The Swiss Tribunal has at times suggested that
the cantons consider alternative means, but has not to date proposed
the concept as a constitutional limitation.13 9
The Tribunal has, however, raised the "alternative means" idea
in a reverse form: as a limitation on the individual. In the "White
Slavery" case, the appellant argued that his film, though admittedly
coarse and brutal, nevertheless conveyed an important social mes-
sage. 40 In refuting this contention, the Tribunal pointed out that
the same social message could have been conveyed with a much less
shocking exhibition. 14' Thus the alternative means idea was ap-
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
'1" See, e.g., Regina-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal FMddral, Sept. 25,
1963, at 7 (Swit.); Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal
Fdddral, March 3, 1954, at 11 (Swit.). See also Cin -Spectacles S. A. contre Genfive,
Tribunal Fdddral, Oct. 22, 1952, 78(1.) Arr&s du Tribunal Fwddral 278 (Swit.), where
the court, in disallowing prior censorship of advertisements, suggested post-prose-
cution as an alternative. The judges noted that it is easy for film promoters to judge
for themselves whether a proposed ad will be immoral, but that it often requires
a board of experts to make a sound moral judgment of a film. Thus, previous review
was reasonable in the one case and not in the other.
1 0 Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fdral, March 3,
1954, at 2-3, 5 (Swit.).
"I Id. at 9.
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plied- to the appellant as a factor in determining the propriety of
his film.'1
C. Censorship Outside the Obscenity Area
The obscenity aspect of censorship in the United States looms
so large that other grounds for banning movies are often obscured.
It is often forgotten that the first case in which the Supreme Court
extended first amendment protection to movies-Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson-43-involved a film that was allegedly "sacrilegious," not
"obscene." Nevertheless, most of the cases which have reached the
Supreme Court have arisen under the obscenity aegis, and no case
involving censorship on other grounds has been decided except in
a prior restraint context. The fact that censors in this country do
ban movies on other than obscenity grounds can hardly be
doubted. 44 That a case involving such a prohibition will reach the
Supreme Court thus seems possible, and the approach that the Court
will use-whether definitional, balancing, or something else-is sub-
ject to speculation. 45
The Swiss censorship authorities quite regularly prohibit the
showing of films on other than obscenity grounds-such as glorifi-
cation of crime. In an interview in 1965 with the head of one of
the cantonal movie boards, this writer elicited the following state-
ment: "Westerns always get a green light, for crime is always pun-
ished, virtue always triumphs."
This pedestrian canon is basically the one utilized by the Tri-
bunal Federal in its review of such cases. If the film actually suggests
1
,2 Compare A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"
v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 462 (1966) (White, J., dissenting): "[Roth does not
mean] . . . that if books like Fanny Hill are unprotected, their nonprurient
appeal is necessarily lost to the world. Literary style, history, teachings about sex,
character description (even of a prostitute) or moral lessons need not come wrapped
in such packages."
3 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
24 For a long list of examples of censors' excisions in a variety of contexts, see
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 69-73 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dis-
senting).
1,5 The Court could apply the same definitional approach as is used with obscenity.
Thus, if something were "sacrilegious" or "criminal," it would not be "speech," and
thus not receive first amendment protection. The task of constitutionally defining
"sacrilegious" or "criminal" would probably produce the same difficulties encountered
in defining "obscenity."
These difficulties might lead the Court to use a balancing approach. The interest
of society in retarding antisocial conduct would be weighed against the benefits of
free dissemination of ideas.
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"that the perfect crime is possible and that it pays off handsomely,"'146
that is a sufficient ground for prohibiting it.
In other nonobscenity situations, the Tribunal will apply the
same criteria that are utilized in judging allegedly obscene films.
D. Freedom of the Press
Article 55 of the federal constitution of Switzerland states that
"the freedom of the press is guaranteed."'147 One might well ask
why the aggrieved movie promoters did not advance the argument
that this basic liberty was infringed by the respective censorship
laws. In only one of the cases which the author has studied was
there even a modest suggestion that this might provide a salient point
from which to attack the imposed ban. 48 The answer to such a
query is simply that in Switzerland movies are not considered to
come within the definition of the press. The following makes this
abundantly clear.
On October 19, 1951, when there was talk of amending article 55
of the federal constitution, the Conseil Fddgral-the Swiss collegiate
executive of seven members-stated:
The guarantee of the liberty of the press is applicable to products
of a printing establishment and to materials of information and
to manuscripts destined to be published among those products of
the printing establishment; the guarantee of the liberty of the
press is not applicable, on the other hand, to the cinema and the
radio.'49
In 1956 there was much discussion about the amendment con-
templated for article 27 of the constitution. On February 24 of that
year, the Conseil Fdderal addressed the following message to the
Federal Assembly-the bicameral legislature of the Republic:
Since the cinema does not come by definition within the notion
of the press, neither is liberty of the press, guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, extended to the cinema. We have already stated this in
241 Sphinx-Film S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fdral, Jan. 6, 1961, at 10
(Swit.).
217 There is no separate "freedom of speech" guarantee, but it is understood to be
embraced by the "freedom of the press" clause. Filmklub Lucerne contre Conseil
d'Etat, Tribunal Fcddral, July 12, 1961, 87 (1.) Arrits du Tribunal F~dral 117 (1962)
(Swit.). See note 9 supra.
"" Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fd&ral,
March 3, 1954, at 9-10 (Swit.).
241 [1951] III Feuille FWdUrale 261.
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our message of October 19, 1951, concerning the revision of
Article 55 of the Constitution. 5 0
The Tribunal Federal had an occasion to express itself on the
matter on July 12, 1961, in the case of Filmklub Lucerne contre
Conseil d'Etat:151
[T]he appellant arms himself with Article 55 which guarantees
liberty of the press and thereby in a general manner every mani-
festation of opinion. In its decrees, still unpublished, rendered
June 14, 1918, in the case of Burckhardt contre Lucerne and on
January 30, 1931 in the case of Praesens-Film AG contre Shaff-
house, the Tribunal Federal said, on conclusive grounds, that a
film is not a product of the press and that its showing, just as a
theatrical performance, does not enjoy the liberty assured to the
press.152
Approaching the case at hand, the Tribunal continued:
There is no reason for departing from this case law, which takes
on particular importance for prior censorship; and such an in-
terpretation accords with the general opinion of commentators
of the Constitution.153
E. Censorship of Private Showings
The Lucerne Film Club is a private association whose members
allegedly are seriously interested in the aesthetic values of certain
movies. Article 56 of the federal constitution provides that "citizens
have the right to form associations, provided that the objects and
methods of such associations are not unlawful or dangerous to the
State." The possibility that private associations could be utilized
to evade the censorship laws may have underlain the Tribunal's
rejection of the Film Club's contention that article 56 thus pro-
tected its showing of questionable films: "[P]rior censorship of per-
formances in a cine-club is reconcilable with liberty of associa-
tion."154
F. Freedom of Commerce
Article 31 of Switzerland's federal constitution reads in part:
"The freedom of trade and commerce is guaranteed throughout the
15o [1956] I Feuille F~ddrale 479.







Confederation.... ." This article has been called a "free competition
and free trade" guarantee, in the sense that those words are under-
stood by classical economists. 155 It is also relevant to point out that
in Swiss law there is no artificial distinction between interstate and
intrastate commerce. Therefore, that a certain business is purely
local does not in itself justify cantonal infringement of this freedom.
When appellants have raised this provision as a retardant to
movie censorship, the Tribunal has conceded that the film industry
is entitled to its protection just as is any industry. But since movies
"are able to involve great dangers for the public welfare, consider-
able restrictions ... are admissible."'156 Additionally, the Tribunal
has alluded to the second paragraph of article 31, which permits
"cantonal regulations concerning .the exercise of commercial and
industrial occupations . . . ." Nevertheless, the Tribunal recognizes
that commerce can be regulated for the common good only insofar as
necessary, and unreasonable regulation will not be allowed. 57
V
CONCLUSION
In an area where uncertainty abounds, an examination of the
solutions found by another system of law is most instructive. Be-
sides providing a fresh approach and varying insights to the problem,
a comparative analysis promotes reevaluation of basic policy con-
siderations.
Much can be learned by comparing the Swiss and American ap-
proaches to specific aspects of the censorship dilemma. The fore-
going pages bring the issues into sharper focus and suggest different
and novel methods for surveying these specific problems.
But this is not the only purpose of this article. Rather, it is
hoped that the reader can bring a more reasoned viewpoint to the
over-all problem of censorship after perusing the material above.
It is not suggested that the Swiss attitude be unquestionably adopted
into American thinking; certainly there are enough significant
differences between the situations in the two countries to caution
against any such a proposal. But the Swiss approach should be con-
"' HcHEs, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF SWITZERLAND 31 (1954).1 6 Gamma-Film Distribution S. A. contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal F&lral, March 3,
1954, at 7 (Swit.).
157 E.g., Kunz contre Conseil d'Etat, Tribunal Fdd&al, Sept. 20, 1961, [1962] Journal
des Tribunaux 340, 343-44 (Swit.).
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sidered as one alternative. If nothing else, it has the virtue of
working well.
This general Swiss attitude is quite clear. The Tribunal
Federal exercises the maximum of restraint in judging acts by the
cantons to censure the movies. Its view is that local conditions and
community standards ought to determine what laws, if any, be
enacted, and that cantonal authorities are best placed to judge these
factors. It feels that any attempt to impose uniform laws throughout
the Republic would be unwise.158 If the multitude of cinema regula-
tions in the tiny Republic of Switzerland sometimes causes incon-
venience, most Swiss seem to accept it as the price they must pay for
keeping their federal system of government alive and functioning.
158 In October 1965, for example, "The Nudist Story" was playing openly in Bern,
the capital of the Republic of Switzerland. Perhaps this demonstrates how strong, how
deep, how varied, how colorful, and how robust is the spirit of Swiss federalism.
